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THE HIGHEST death is to die without having thought about it in ad­
vance/’ writes Montaigne (Essais). It might be possible for some to ig­
nore death by not thinking of it and not questioning its meaning. 
Again, even if one knows that death is inescapable, one might not 
dwell on it, but rather think primarily of life and seek after life. A 
death met precisely in the midst of the earnest pursuit of life and un­
concern for death may be called the highest death. The present age is 
one of fulfillment and enjoyment of life. Nevertheless, due to the ap­
pearance of absolute weapons, the present age has at the same time 
become an age of anxiety over death and of nihilism. Indeed, does not 
anxiety and nihilism characterize humankind’s present existential situa­
tion? People grieve over the fact that they must die, rather than over 
death itself. This brings to mind Pascal’s profound words: “Death is 
easier to endure for the man who does not think of it than for the per­
son who, though he is not directly in danger of dying, still thinks about 
it” (Pensees). For animals, even if there is “the fact of death,” there is 
no “problem of death.” Only for humans, who consciously face “the 
fact of death,” does it become an intense “problem.”
Consequently, wherever man has existed, in the East and the West,
•This paper was originally published in Japanese in the journal Zengaku kenkyQ 
(Studies in Zen Buddhism), Vol. 51 (February 1961), pp. 88-112. The author is grateful 
to Professor David Dilworth for his translation and to Mr. Christopher A. Ives and 
Dr. Paul L. Swanson for their valuable suggestions in the final stages of manuscript 
preparation.
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there have appeared various self-conscious attitudes toward death, and 
different ways of solving the problem of death have been proposed. 
Just as only humans question death, it appears that only humans can 
truly experience death. Only those who truly die can truly live. Self-con- 
sciousness of dying is then ultimately bound up with self-consciousness 
of living. Among the various forms of the self-awareness of death in 
human history, I would like to take up the notions of the immortality 
of the soul, eternal life, and unbornness as the most fundamental 
understandings of the problem of death realized by human beings.
I
The idea that the soul does not die even though the body perishes has 
arisen in people’s minds since ancient times. This widely shared idea is 
perhaps crystallized in its purest form and attains an extremely pro­
found “self-awareness of death” in Plato’s doctrine of the immortality 
of the soul.
To Plato, death is nothing other than the release of the imperishable 
soul from the perishable body. Death is the separation of soul from the 
body: the body separates from the soul and becomes body only. The 
soul separates from the body and becomes the pure soul itself (Phaedo 
64c). The body (sOma) is frequently likened to the tomb (sSma) of the 
soul (Gorgias 493a). From such a point of view it can be said that for 
Plato, death is not the body entering the tomb; on the contrary, it is the 
release of the soul from the tomb of the body. Through death, the soul 
rids itself of the bonds of the flesh and becomes pure; it returns to 
itself, eternal and imperishable. Consequently, the true philosophos 
longs for death, and believing in happiness after death (Phaedo 64a), 
faces death calmly. The philosopher believes that apart from the realm 
of the dead, he cannot encounter that which is his own raison d'etre, 
the attainment of pure wisdom.
The death of Plato’s teacher, Socrates, seems to have functioned as a 
very powerful force behind this kind of self-consciousness of death in 
Plato. His self-awareness of death was in fact conjoined with a clear 
concept of the immortality of the soul.
Yet the concept of the immortality of the soul is not peculiar to 
Plato. It is found in the Orphic religion of his day, and also in the 
Phythagorean school. The Phythagoreans, however, understood the 
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soul as not being itself eternal and imperishable, but as eternal because 
it transmigrates from one body to another. Within that limitation, the 
soul could live forever by depending on the body, without being eternal 
in itself. In Plato, on the other hand, the soul is understood as eternal 
in itself, preceding the body and independent of the body. It is seen as 
having the character of “something divine, immortal, that which 
becomes the object of intellect, has a simple form, indivisible, a perma­
nent existence that never changes the way of being of itself” (ibid., 
80b). Plato believes that the soul is apart from the body, eternal and im­
mortal in itself. But Plato can also be said to recognize the fact of 
transmigration of the soul when he says that the soul changes many 
bodies like a tailor who replaces his old worn-out coats (ibid., 87d). 
Plato’s concept of the immortality of the soul, however, still differs 
from that of the Pythagorean school. In Plato’s case, it is not that the 
soul is immortal and eternal because it changes bodies, but that it is 
able to transmigrate precisely because it is immortal and eternal in 
essence.
At this point, we can see that the Platonic soul possesses the 
character of Platonic Ideas. The soul partakes of eternal existence. It 
exists not through the body but through itself. Transcending all change 
and birth and death, it partakes of the transcendent nature of the Ideas 
which always exist in themselves. It differs in essence from the body, 
which is subject to change, birth and death, and which does not possess 
a permanent nature in itself. At the root of Plato’s theory of immortal­
ity of the soul in the Phaedo, his theory of Ideas is clearly evident; 
without a grasp of his theory of Ideas it would be impossible to under­
stand his concept of the immortality of the soul. He sought that which 
is invisible beyond the visible and phenomenal, the permanent and un­
changing above and beyond whatever changes, the pure and simple 
behind the many, and the eternal and imperishable beyond the 
perishable. This is the reason he distinguished the Ideas from the 
phenomenal. In Plato’s case, discussion of the soul, which is im­
perishable by transcending the death of the body, at the same time en­
tails the imperishability of the Ideas. To clarify the immortality of the 
soul is to prove the existence of the Ideas, and conversely the immortal­
ity of the soul is demonstrated from the existence of the Ideas. This 
point, Plato’s clear grasp of the Idea-like character of the soul, may be 
considered the reason why Plato differs from the Pythagoreans and 
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goes a step beyond them, even though they both teach the same immor­
tality of the soul.
This point can be clearly read within Plato’s argument developed 
through the mouth of Socrates, in his response to the doubt raised by 
Cebes, himself a student of the Pythagorean school. The argument can 
be called the climax of Phaedo. Cebes’ doubt is as follows. He 
recognizes that the soul is stronger and longer lasting than the body 
and transmigrates through many lives, but this does not necessarily 
prove the immortality of the soul itself. For the possibility remains that 
the soul gradually deteriorates as it passes through many transmigra­
tions and, finally, in a “death” somewhere along the line, it completely 
perishes. If no one can know of the “death” which brings final extinc­
tion to the soul, and unless the soul can be proven to be immortal and 
imperishable in the perfect sense, who could prove that a belief which 
precludes the fear of death is not the result of foolishness? (ibid., 88a, 
b). Against this keen doubt, which perhaps is grounded in the thought 
of the Pythagorean school, Plato has Socrates make the following 
rebuttal.
Just as everything beautiful is beautiful by means of “Beauty in 
itself,” so too a Form exists for everything and is called the same name 
as the Form by virtue of participating in this Form. Thus, while the 
number three does not oppose “even numbers,” it does not partake of 
“even numbers.” For three has as its form “oddness” which is op­
posed to “even numbers.” Again, fire is not directly opposed to 
“cold” but does not partake of “coldness,” for fire has the form of 
“hotness” which is the opposite of “coldness.” Similarly, the soul 
itself which brings life to the body by occupying it is not directly op­
posed to “death” but, as the principle of life, it does not partake of 
death. According to this logic, the soul must possess a character op­
posite to “death,” namely, “death-less-ness.” Consequently when 
death invades a man, his mortal part dies, but his immortal part, 
ceding the place to “death,” goes away while it itself is not affected nor 
does it perish (ibid., 100b-106e).
As is plainly evident in this rebuttal to Cebes* argument, immortality 
for Plato is essential to the soul and is grounded in his theory of Ideas. 
Accordingly, in Plato’s case, his self-consciousness of death must also 
be said to be based on his theory of Ideas. Death is neither something 
like a dream wherein every kind of sensation has merely disappeared, 
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nor is it the extinction of existence. It is precisely death which brings 
about distinction between Ideas and phenomena by the separating of 
soul and body. Conversely, in death, the immortal soul and the realm 
of Ideas become manifest.
Yet as long as we are living, the soul exists together with the body; 
and as long as it exists together with the body, the soul cannot purely 
know the realm of Ideas. Rather, when housed in the body, the soul 
often goes astray, becomes confused, and is deceived. In order to 
realize the truth of things and attain to their reality, the soul must strive 
to become pure soul itself, without being agitated by anything 
physical—neither hearing, nor sight, nor sufferings and pleasures 
(ibid., 65c). Only when the soul gets rid of bodily contamination and 
becomes pure, and simply contemplates things by itself, does it have a 
relation with the permanent and immutable Ideas, and preserves a 
permanent and immutable way of being itself. This condition of the 
soul is called wisdom (phrdntsis) (ibid., 79d). Clear knowledge or pure 
thinking can only be attained by the pure soul uninfected by the corrup­
tion of the body. But it is precisely death that releases the soul from the 
bonds of the body and makes it free and pure. Consequently, the 
philosopher, the lover of wisdom, must of course be one who does not 
fear death. If a man grieves and becomes afraid when facing death, he 
is not a philosopher who loves and pursues wisdom; he would be 
someone attached to the body, perhaps one who loves money and fame 
as well (ibid., 98b,c). The task towards which the philosopher in the 
true sense strives is nothing other than to go to death and complete it. 
He is one who “practices dying*’ (ibid., 64a, 67c). This is, for Plato, 
the understanding of wisdom and the soul, and also the way of the 
philosopher.
II
In Plato’s case, however, immortality of the soul does not merely per­
tain to life after death. It is at the same time related to a person’s life 
prior to birth. Plato firmly believes that as long as it is immortal, the 
soul exists apart from the body even before it dwells among us. Plato’s 
fundamental standpoint is that the soul has an existent nature akin to 
the transcendent nature of the Ideas, and a permanent nature apart 
from the body. The soul’s pre-existence is proven by the theory of 
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recollection (andmnSsis), but here too we see that the immortality of 
the soul is grounded in the theory of Ideas.
Plato already in the Meno (8Id) held the position that learning is ac­
tually nothing but recollecting. In the Phaedo, he grasps recollection as 
the function that recognizes the Ideas to be essentially different from in­
dividual things which come into being and pass away, and attempts 
thereby to prove the pre-existence of the soul. In other terms, the Idea 
of “Equality in itself’ is completely different in essence from any 
“equal thing.” Indeed, when we have known that two stones are equal 
through sensation, we have known “Equality in itself” by taking the 
sensation of “equal things” as occasion. In such a way, is not embrac­
ing B in the mind on the occasion of perceiving A, an act of recollec­
tion? Such Ideas as “Equality in itself,” “The Good in itself,” and 
“The Beautiful in itself’ are recollected in this way by taking sensation 
of individual things as occasions: but still the sensation of individual 
things does not ground the reality of the Ideas. Those which we grasp 
through sensation are merely imperfect things, from which “Equality 
in itself’ and “the Good in itself’ cannot be extracted. Sensation of in­
dividual things is only an occasion that causes that which cannot be 
grasped immediately in itself to be only indirectly recollected; but the 
Ideas, on the contrary, precede things and constitute their ground. In 
other words, the Ideas are certainly recognized by taking the sensation 
of individual things as occasion, but things sensed can rather be called 
“equal things” or “good things” in reference to those Ideas. If we con­
sider that what is known by recollection in this way—for example, 
“Equality in itself”—becomes the standard in terms of which a judg­
ment is made that things sensed are truly equal to one another, it 
should be clear that the Ideas precede individuals.
The soul must, therefore, have knowledge of what “Equality in 
itself’ and “Good in itself’ is before we begin to use the senses, that is, 
prior to birth; and consequently it must be said that the soul necessarily 
has existed even prior to our being born, and has pre-existed with such 
knowledge of the Ideas. This is the reason Plato has Socrates say that 
“The soul has existed separate from the body even before dwelling in 
the form of man, and had power of knowledge” (Phaedo 76c). 
Recollection is nothing other than the fact that the soul, while possess­
ing such knowledge prior to birth, has lost it when it comes to be born, 
and later on regains that former knowledge through the clues of sensa­
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tion. Recollection is neither a mere association of ideas nor a calling up 
of the remembrances of the past. It is the soul’s returning to itself, and 
the intuition of the Ideas thereby. Recollection always takes sensation 
of individual things as occasion, but therein the realm of Ideas comes 
to be called up within the soul.
In this way Plato asserted not only the immortality of the soul after 
death but its pre-existence before birth as well. This assertion was 
based on his belief in the eternal and immutable nature of the soul 
which transcends the birth, death, and changes of the body. I have 
already mentioned that Plato’s theory of the immortality of soul is 
based on this Idea-like nature of the existence of the soul. But Plato 
did not merely seek the eternal and the immutable in the past or future. 
Rather, he sought it within the present. He neither wished for the im­
mortality of the world after death by fleeing the present reality, nor 
yearned for the purity of the world prior to birth through recollection. 
He attempted to live in purity of soul while possessing a body within 
present reality. This is why Plato says that the true philosopher “prac­
tices dying.” For Plato, to philosophize meant to purify (katharsis) the 
soul bound by the body within the present reality of this world from 
bodily corruption, to make the soul pure while it exists with the body, 
and thus to think the world of Ideas. For Plato, who holds that death 
brings about release of the soul from the prison of the body, to 
philosophize is nothing other than precisely to “practice dying” while 
living. It is to live through dying, to practice dying while living. Herein 
is the way of the philosopher for Plato—the way in which death is over­
come.
In Plato, the question of death is certainly grasped subjectively and 
practically, but it is clear that at its root there is a kind of dualism of 
body and soul, and a two-world theory which separates the world of 
phenomena and the world of Ideas. Immortality of the soul is also 
grasped through pure thinking and anamnesis while the soul has a 
body in this world, but it ultimately is based on the world of Ideas in 
the background of present reality. Even if it is said that the Ideas ap­
pear within present reality, it is still held that they transcend present 
reality. In that respect his standpoint is one of an a-temporal, a- 
historical eternity, of eternity in the sense of endlessness (Unend- 
lichkeit). Accordingly his self-consciousness of death, no matter how 
subjectively it is grasped, still retains that which is seen objectively.
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III
In contrast to this view, there is a standpoint which does not view the 
relation between body and soul dualistically, as in Plato, or teach im­
mortality on the basis of considering death as the separation of soul 
from body. Instead it grasps the body and soul as a unity and believes 
in the death of man—who is this unity of body and soul—and his eter­
nal life. Let us now turn our attention to the self-consciousness of 
death in Christianity as the teaching which, while assuming this stand­
point, has developed a very profound religious nature.
Even among the Hebrews there were words such as rfiah and 
nephesh to express the spirit distinguished from the flesh (bdsQr), and 
to express the spirit after death. Spirit and body are not, however, 
understood as entities dualistically opposed, as in the case of Plato. 
They are considered an organic unity. Man is simultaneously soul and 
body. Therefore there is no concept corresponding to the Greek idea 
that the body is the prison of the soul and death the separation of the 
soul from the body. In his book, What is Man? Wolfhart Pannenberg 
states: “In the sense of the concept that a part of man continues 
beyond death in an unbroken way, the idea of immortality cannot be 
held. . .. The inner life of our consciousness is so tied to our corporeal 
functions that it is impossible for it to be able to continue by itself 
alone” (pp. 49-50). For the Hebrews, people descended after death to 
the netherworld as both body and soul. The one sleeping in the grave is 
not the soul of the dead person, but the deceased himself. Thus it 
would seem natural that body and soul are considered as a unity both 
in life and death in the Judaic-Christian standpoint which understands 
a person as a creature of God. For the Christians, since both soul and 
body originate in the creation of God, the body is not the prison of the 
soul but rather a “temple of the Holy Spirit” (1 Cor. 6:19). What must 
be essentially distinguished in Christianity is not soul and body, but 
God and man.1
1 The Greek word corresponding to nephesh is psyche. In the Bible, nephesh ex­
presses the life which is in creatures, that is, soul, and it is often translated into 
Japanese as mochi (life). In contrast, the Greek term corresponding to ruah is pnetima; 
rtiah indicates life which has been given by God that is spirit. The Greek term cor­
responding to bastir is sarx, besides which in the New Testament, the word sOma is 
used to express the body.
Since these terms are not necessarily used in a single sense throughout the Bible, we 
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For Christianity, the life of a person is grasped not as a substantial 
entity that exists in itself, but as something in vital connection with 
God the creator. For the prophets of the Old Testament, when the God 
Jehovah turns away his face, it signifies his wrath and judgment (Jer. 
44:11, Ezek. 15:7). In contrast to this, when God and man meet face to 
face, God and man are related not only vitally but personally. The God 
who speaks therein is like a person, and man who answers is also a per­
son. This relation between God and man is linked by the word. Indeed, 
death for man is nothing other than a severance of this vital and per­
sonal link with God. For the people of the Old Testament, death in fact 
cut off the bond between God and person rather than between person 
and person, and one fears death not because of returning to 
nothingness but because the relation with God is sundered.
In Christianity, indeed, the origin of sin lies in human disobedience 
to God, and rebellion against the word of God constitutes the essence 
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must be careful in interpreting them. Yet in the Bible, body (sOma) and soul (psyche) 
are not understood as dualistically opposed, as in the case of Greek philosophy (again, 
meanings implied in these terms are not the same as in the case of Greek philosophy). 
A conspicuous feature of Hebraism is that the body is the expression of the soul and 
both are understood as a unity.
However, Paul saw in man a duality of what is corruptible, namely, flesh (sarx), and 
what is incorruptible, namely, spirit (pneuma)', the former he calls “the outer man,’’ 
and the latter “the inner man” (2 Cor. 4:16, Rom. 7:22). In this way he establishes a 
dualism of body and soul (sOma and psyche), the body belonging to the outer man, as 
things pertaining to natural life in general, and the soul to the inner man, namely, the 
spirit (pneiima), that is linked to God. Thus, he says, “For the mind that is set on the 
flesh is hostile to God” (Rom. 8:7), so the flesh that is the power of sin and death wars 
in man with the spirit, and “For those who live according to the flesh set their minds on 
the things of the flesh, but those who live according to the Spirit set their minds on the 
things of the Spirit” (Rom. 8:5). It must be fully borne in mind, however, that this 
Pauline teaching of the dualistic complication of spirit and flesh is one in which man 
still lives in relation to God, even as man, having both inner and outer natures, feels 
the tension of whether to entrust to himself to and follow the Holy Spirit that is the 
creative power of God; the Pauline teaching remains essentially different from Plato’s 
philosophy where we find an opposition of soul and body without the relation to a 
transcendent personal God.
Thus in Paul, in contrast to the fact that for one who lives following the flesh, as 
neither the body (sOma) nor the soul (psyche) as things that are “perishable” (I Cor. 
15:42), namely, as comprising the animate body (sOma psychikon), can avoid death, it 
is promised that for one who follows the Spirit of God, and in whom dwells the spirit 
of Christ, the body (sOma) will become “the temple of the Holy Spirit” and “member 
of Christ” (1 Cor. 6:15), and after death will rise again as a spiritual body (sOma 
pneumatikon).
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of sin. Accordingly, it is natural that, due to committing the sin of 
rebelling against God’s word, it is ordained that man must die by the 
severance of his vital bond with God based on the word. Loss of the 
relation with God is nothing other than the result of sin. “The wages of 
sin is death” (Rom. 6:23) may be thought truly to have had this mean­
ing. Original life is uncorrupt as something given from God; conse­
quently, death menaces people not as something natural but only as the 
result of sin. Herein lies the distinct characteristic of the self-con­
sciousness of death in Christianity.
For the Christian, then, “death” has at least two meanings. First, 
death severs the vital and personal bond with God the creator. Sec­
ond, death is repayment for the sin of rebelling against God and is 
the judgment given by God for sin.
First, a fear of death is expressed throughout the Old and New 
Testaments. The reverse side of the fear of death would seem to be at­
tachment to life. However, the attachment to life which appears in the 
Bible is essentially different from the attachment to life which many 
modem men exhibit. It is not attachment to life itself, but rather an at­
tachment in the sense of a person not wanting to lose the fundamental 
bond with God, the creator of his or her own life. To fall into the 
hands of death is to be abandoned by God. Even Jesus, faced with 
death in the garden of Gethsemane, was “greatly distressed and trou­
bled” and complained to his disciples that “my soul is very sorrowful, 
even to death” (Mark 14:33-34). On the cross he emitted the sorrowful 
cry, “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” (Mark 15:34). 
At that point, Jesus’ death is the diametrical opposite of Socrates who, 
conceiving of death as the soul entering the world of Ideas by being re­
leased from the body, calmly accepted the hemlock and personally prac­
ticed the philosophy of the immortality of the soul. Even Jesus’ prayer 
in Gethesemane, “Yet not what I wilt, but what thou wilt” (Mark 
14:36), did not mean that his fear of death had gone, but seems to 
mean that if this most horrendous death derives from God’s will, he 
would dare to obey it too.2 Since Jesus as the son of God is more pro­
foundly linked to God than anyone else, he feels the fear of death 
which would cut him off from God more deeply than any other man.
2 Oscar Cullman, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? (New York: 
Macmillan, 1958), p. 22.
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Precisely because he obeys the will of God to the very end, he accepts 
his death. Even for Christ who put all his enemies under his feet, death 
is truly “the last enemy” to be feared (1 Cor. 15:26).
Second, however, death is not merely the last enemy for man, but at 
the same time is “the wages of sin.” The body, too, which is the sub­
ject of desires and evanescently perishes, is not something evil in itself, 
but has only come to have the fate of such destruction as the result of 
sin. The sin of Adam who disobeyed the word of God extends to the 
whole of existence of man who is a unity of soul and body, and death 
also extends to all creatures as the result of that sin. “Therefore as sin 
came into the world through one man and death through sin, so death 
spread to all men because all men sinned” (Rom. 5:12). In Christian­
ity, death is essentially linked to sin. Death does not become prob­
lematic merely in itself. What becomes problematic is not death as 
death, but death as sin.
This is a theme which is completely absent in the Greek Platonic 
philosophy. It can be said that in Plato, too, death is not treated as a 
problem merely in itself. What becomes problematic for Plato is not 
death as death—even less is it death as sin—but death as release of the 
soul to the world of Ideas. Death is not repayment for sin enjoined by 
God, but the release of the soul from the body in order for it to return 
to the realm of the pure Ideas. Therein death does not pertain to the 
soul but only to the body; similarly, evil does not pertain to the soul 
but only to the body. Evil exists in the sensory, and not within the Idea­
like soul. Though evil is due to an absence of the soul and insufficiency 
of education, it is not personal sin—even less is it personal sin as 
rebellion against the will of the creator. In Plato, death, as that which 
causes release of the immortal soul to the realm of the ideas, has a 
positive meaning—this is precisely the reason why Socrates met death 
calmly—but the problem of human evil is only negatively understood. 
Consequently, even if there is pure yearning for the realm of Ideas by 
transcending even death, there is no consciousness of personal sin by 
subjective individuals. Therefore, although death becomes the moment 
which causes the world of Ideas to become manifest, it is not linked to 
sin.
In Christianity, on the contrary, death is in all respects the result of 
sin as rebellion against the word of God. The fact that man, the 
creature of God, instead of believing and obeying the word of God, 
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becomes an autonomous existence independent of God and freely will­
ing—that is, that man becomes man himself—-is the insolence (hybrid) 
of man. Death, the severance of the vital bond with God, is enjoined 
by God as repayment for this sin. Without sin there would be no death 
in which the vital bond with God is severed. Thus in Christianity, death 
is not something which pertains only to the body and not the soul, as in 
the case of Platonic philosophy. It pertains to the whole being of man. 
The consciousness of “sin” which causes man to die is linked to the 
very self-consciousness of human autonomous existence. Therein differ­
ing from Plato’s philosophy, death in Christianity is grasped as a pro­
blem truly pertaining to a person’s entire being—moreover, within the 
personal dialogue with God the absolute, as a problem pertaining to 
the deepest source of human nature.
IV
How is death conquered in Christianity? It cannot be separated from 
the faith which believes in the fact of Jesus’ death and resurrection. 
The belief that Jesus is the incarnation of the Word of God, that 
human sins are redeemed through his death on the cross, and that the 
severed relationship between God and man is also restored through his 
death and resurrection may be called the kernel of Christian faith. That 
Jesus Christ conquers sin and death in this world through his crucifix­
ion and resurrection, becoming the complete victor, and that thus a 
new age is begun, is the belief which runs throughout the New Testa­
ment. According to Karl Barth, the significance of Christ’s death is 
that on the one hand it is the curse, judgment, and protest of God, but 
at the same time the sanction, sacrifice, and victory of God?
1. Christ’s crucifixion, death, and burial (sepultus) signify that as a 
man, Jesus took upon himself and personally experienced the suffering 
of death as repayment for sin. There may be nothing which more viv­
idly makes us ponder the severity of the suffering of death than Christ’s 
agonized cry, “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” 
However, according to Barth, Jesus’ death is “the self-sacrifice of God
3 Karl Barth, Credo: Die Hauptprobleme der Dogmatik dargestellt im auschluss an 
das Apostolische glaubeskenntnis (Dritte Auflage, Munchen: C. Kaiser, 1935), p. 75. 
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for the existence and destiny of man.”4 Christ’s crucifixion is nothing 
other than the deepest form of the hidden God. The Son of God “emp­
tied himself, taking the form of a servant,” and again “humbling 
himself and became obedient unto death, even death on a cross” (Phil. 
2:6-8). Christ’s crucifixion is indeed God’s own judgment upon 
himself, and at the same time the judgment given for the sin of people 
in Christ. Only as something crushed by the anger of God in Jesus 
Christ does man himself become self-conscious of his sin. The hidden
God is for man the face of death.
2. However, at the same time, in the crucifixion of Christ, God emp­
ties himself and embraces within himself even human unpardonable 
original sin, and by causing his only son to die accomplishes redemp­
tion of sin in man’s place. This is nothing other than reconciliation 
with God. The painful concealment of the cross where he himself 
agonized is the revelation of the absolute mercy of God who is hidden 
in Christ. The absolute death in which God himself takes on the sin 
and blame of man is absolute life. Jesus’ death, indeed, signifies the 
revelation of true life as eternal life which is now immortal. This is the 
resurrection of Christ.
Belief in Jesus is nothing other than belief in the fact of his death and 
resurrection. In Jesus Christ, death is for the first time converted into 
life. Faith entails the fact of continuous dying together with the crucifix­
ion. “Let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me. For 
whosoever would save his life will lose it, and whosoever loses his life 
for my sake and the Gospel’s will save it” (Mark 8:34-35). By taking up 
one’s own cross and “being buried with Christ”—-that is the meaning 
of baptism—the Christian also participates in Jesus’ death and resurrec­
tion.
Barth writes: “God became mortal man in Jesus Christ, restored the 
destruction of the relation with man in his obedience, and in his death 
carried man’s sin and eternal death which is its result.. .. Precisely this 
God is the immortal God with whom man can be united in death,... is 
the hope of all men.” Again: “God assumed the death of man through 
Jesus Christ, caused him to have immortality, and gave eternal life.”5
Karl Rahner, although with somewhat different connotations, also
4 Barth, p. 78.
5 Luyten, Portmann, Jaspers, Barth: Unsterblichkeit (Basel: F. Reinhardt, 1957), p. 
50.
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states, “The mystery of the Incarnation must be in God himself, and 
precisely in the fact that, although he is immutable in and of himself, 
he himself can become something in another.”6 “The Logos became 
man—the history of the becoming of his human reality became his own 
history—our time became the time of the eternal One—our death 
became the death of the immortal God himself.”7
6 K. Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Chris­
tianity (New York: Crossroad, 1982), p. 221.
7 Rahner, p. 220.
In Christianity both life and death, and eternal life as their conquest, 
is grasped in all aspects in relation with God. Death is not the release of 
the soul from the prison of the body, as in Plato. It is a severance of the 
vital and personal bond with God the creator, a severance as the result 
of sin which is rebellion against the word of God. Moreover, in Plato’s 
case, the conquering of death appears within the way of the 
philosopher who, while firmly believing in the immortality of soul that 
has an Idea-like transcendent nature, purifies the soul while in the 
bonds of the body, and practices dying while living. In the case of 
Christianity, through faith in the death and resurrection of Jesus as the 
redemption of sin, the severed relation with God is restored and a new 
life is received that is established by transcending even death. It is not a 
philosophical self-consciousness of the immortality of the Idea-like 
soul, but faith in the resurrection of the dead as the righteousness of 
God—faith in eternal life based on the restoration of one’s relation 
with God.
For the Christian who is self-conscious of the fact that he is deter­
mined to die because of sin, the possibility of anamnesis which is a 
return to eternal essence, to pure soul, would seem to be ultimately in­
conceivable. The Christian is profoundly self-conscious that an eternal 
essence which conquers evil and death cannot be discovered within 
himself. The Christian participates in the eternal not by recollection 
(andmnZsis) but by revelation (Offenbarung). Only through Jesus 
Christ as the revelation of the word of God does a person recover the 
link with eternal life that has been lost as the result of sin. “The word 
of God that was in the beginning, the word of God who creates us, 
comes to us again as Jesus Christ.. .. However, not as the human 
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possibility of anamnesis but as the divine possibility of restitutio im­
agines
That this restitutio imaginis (restoration of the image) is possible, 
needless to say, has been demonstrated by the fact of the resurrection 
of Jesus Christ. The Christian “resurrection” differs in essence from 
the Platonic “immortality of soul.” Just as death in Christianity is not 
merely the perishing of the body but death as unity of soul and body, 
so too the Christian resurrection is not merely resurrection of the soul, 
but of the dead person who is a unity of soul and body. As Paul says, 
“Christ, who will change our lowly body to be like his glorious body” 
(Phil. 3:21), it is not a bodiless Idea, but resurrection as a “spiritual 
body.” Consequently the resurrection is not merely the overcoming of 
the bodily nature, but of death itself. It is the receiving of a new life by 
conquering death. The resurrection is the work of God (for example, 1 
Cor. 15:15-16), and is not something demonstrable by pure philo­
sophic thought. It is the fact that the entire existence of a person is 
rescued from death by the working of a new creation by God. For the 
Christian, the hope of resurrection is not based on any kind of specula­
tion—philosophical or apocalyptical—but to the very end is based on 
the fact of Christ’s resurrection. Jesus Christ is not merely a man, but 
“the man” who represents all people, the second Adam, and in his 
resurrection all humankind fundamentally conquers death. This is the 
reason it is written: “Death has been swallowed up by victory. O death, 
where is thy victory? Death, where is thy sting?” (1 Cor. 15:55-56). The 
history of the human fall begins from the first Adam. But the sin of 
humankind is redeemed, death as the “wages” of sin is conquered, and 
a new age is begun by the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the se­
cond Adam. “For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made 
alive” (1 Cor. 15:22). This is the definite significance of the historical in­
cidents of Christ’s death and resurrection.
V
However, it is not that all of humankind immediately lives again and 
receives a “glorious body” together with the resurrection of Christ. In 
Christ’s resurrection, it has been demonstrated in principle that death
8 Emil Brunner, Eternal Hope, tr. Harold Knight (Westminster Press, 1954). p. 106. 
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can be conquered. Christ truly is its “first fruits” (1 Cor. 15:23), and a 
new age has begun in Christ. Neither does the Christian, who believes 
that death has been fundamentally conquered in Christ’s resurrection, 
by his faith change immediately from corruptible body into an incor­
ruptible one, or from perishable body to the “glorious body.” The 
resurrection does not occur immediately after the death of each person. 
It must be awaited until the end of time when Christ will come again. 
In his second coming, Christ “will judge the living and the dead” (1 
Pet. 4:5). At this end of time, the hidden Christ will reveal his complete 
power and glory, and before his judgment all the deeds done within 
history will be openly judged and will be realistically repayed according 
to the reality of faith or non-faith. The believers will arise from the 
dead, and attaining “glorious bodies” will rise again and receive eter­
nal life; the unbelievers will be handed over to eternal punishment. 
Therefore, the last judgment for the Christian is a hope rather than 
fear. The Christian is presently living in the “middle-time” 
(Zwischenzeit) between this resurrection of Christ (the beginning of the 
new age) and the second coming (its end).
For the Christian who is living in this middle-time, however, the 
hope in the resurrection in the end of time is hardly a contentless, emp­
ty hope. For those who believe in the resurrection of Jesus Christ “are 
buried together with Christ through baptism into death,” and this is en­
tirely “so that as Christ was raised from the dead ... we too might 
walk in newness of life” (Rom. 6:4). In other words, in baptism the 
Christian does not believe in the fact of Christ’s death and resurrection 
as a mere object, but he dies together with Christ, and lives together 
with Christ. The following famous words of Paul would seem to ex­
press this fact most powerfully: “I have been crucified with Christ, it is 
no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me, and the life I now live 
in the flesh, I have to live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and 
gave himself for me” (Gal. 2:20). For Paul, baptism was not merely be­
ing baptized in the name of Jesus Christ, but being baptized into Christ 
(Gal. 3:27). This is the reason that one dies together with Christ and 
participates in his resurrection. Here we realize the existence of a 
mystical experience which is not restricted to what is called faith. The 
“old man” has been crucified together with Christ (Rom. 6:6) and is 




For the Christian, therefore, it is precisely dying together with Christ 
that is the beginning of resurrection into eternal life. While for the 
Christian, the resurrection is a hope to be realized at the end of history, 
the resurrection is experienced in advance in the present. As it is writ­
ten, “our inward man is renewed day by day’’ (2 Cor. 4:16) by the 
working of the Holy Spirit through faith. The new life has already 
begun. But just as Paul says, “I die every day” (1 Cor. 15:31), this new 
life takes the form of constant dying. The living behavior wherein one 
perfectly lives the new life is always at the same time the experience of 
dying (mortificatio)? In the practice of the Christian, so-called life ap­
pears as death, and new life is perfected within constant dying. Here we 
may call to mind Plato’s teaching that “philosophy is a practicing of 
dying.’’ For Plato, too, the practicing of dying while living is the 
highest way for a person. But in Plato’s concept of practicing dying, 
there is no encounter with history. It is not obstructed by the corrup­
tion of the body while living; it takes place a-temporally, unrelated to 
history and transcending birth, death, and change, in seeing the eternal 
Ideas.
For the Christian, on the contrary, the progress of his new life that is 
dying and resurrecting day by day is deeply bound up with history. It 
also possesses an eschatological seal. The Christian participates in the 
new life of the resurrection by being baptized into Christ and dying 
together with Christ; but his complete resurrection and new life that is 
“to be like his glorious body” must wait for the end of history. 
Through Christ’s death and resurrection, sin and evil have been con­
quered and the decisive battle is now over, but the day of final victory 
when all of humankind is reborn has not yet come. The Christian is 
always within the tension of the middle-time. Accordingly, the pro­
gress of new life that is a daily dying and resurrecting is the practice of 
love in the present of this middle-time which is supported by faith and 
hope.
Faith believes in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, the second Adam, 
who has redeemed, by his death on the cross, the history of the human 
fall beginning with the first Adam and begun a new era by conquering 
even that death. The hope is to be resurrected in complete glory by the 
second coming of Christ at the end of history. The practice of love is
9 Brunner, p. 111. 
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bound up with the task of history in the rebirth of all of humankind 
and, ultimately, is based on God who is hidden in Christ. The self-con- 
sciousness of death and the conquering of it in Christianity must be 
understood within this kind of practice of love. Therein we find a stand­
point of faith deeply related to history, and immanently linked with 
ethical practice. This differs greatly from the a-historical intellectual, 
contemplative standpoint of Plato to whom philosophizing is a practic­
ing of dying.
VI
It can be said that humankind has crystallized within Eastern Bud­
dhism a self-consciousness of death which differs from the self-con­
sciousness of death in Platonic philosophy and in Christianity which 
we have reviewed to this point.
It is a well known story that the Buddha, when asked about the ex­
istence of the soul after death, answered with silence. Buddhism 
teaches neither the imperishability of the soul nor the extinction of the 
soul. Buddhism originally did not recognize the existence of the soul 
distinguished from the body, and the problem of death was not 
understood to be solved merely in terms of immortality or non-extinc- 
tion, and of eternal life. In Buddhism, resolution of the problem of 
death is sought in terms of no-birth and no-extinction, or unbornness 
and undying, that is, in terms of transcending “birth and extinction” 
or “birth and death” itself.
The “Verse on the Impermanence of All Things” (ShogyO mu jo ge 
in the Nirvana Sutra directly articulates the essence of Bud­
dhism; it consists of the four lines:
All things are impermanent: 
They appear and disappear; 
When an end is put
to this appearance and disappearance,
&&&& The bliss of nirvana is realized.
The first two lines—“All things are impermanent: They appear and 
disappear”—express the Buddhist’s cognition of actuality (the realities 
of the world). The third line—“When an end is put to this appearance 
and disappearance”—does not merely teach that there is non-extinc- 
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tion or immortality when extinction is overcome, but emphasizes the 
need to overcome both birth (appearance) and extinction (disap­
pearance) as a duality. The last line—“The bliss of nirvana is realized” 
when this very fact of appearance and disappearance is transcended— 
teaches the attainment of nirvana which is the ultimate goal of Bud­
dhism. Therefore the third line, “When an end is put to this appear­
ance and disappearance,” must be said to be the pivot causing present 
reality to be converted into nirvana.
“Appearance and disappearance” (shOmetsu £M) would seem to be 
an expression referring broadly to organic and inorganic things, but in 
reference to beings that have life, it is of course “birth-and-death” 
(shOji &ft). Consequently, the standpoint of Buddhism can be 
understood not from the perspective of attaining immortality by ex­
tinguishing death relative to life, but as the attainment of no-birth and 
no-death by extinguishing birth and death themselves—of that which 
has transcended birth and death (samsara) itself. The standpoint of 
Buddhism vividly comes out in the term “no-birth” or “unborn” 
(fushO ?F±) which means neither im-mortal, nor non-extinction, nor 
eternal life, but a freedom from the duality of birth and death.
When human existence is said to be impermanent, it does not merely 
mean that it is impermanent because death exists over against life; it 
must mean that the very fact that there is birth-and-death is the true 
reality of impermanence. We are impermanent not merely because we 
are perishable existences, but precisely because we are existences that 
constantly are born and die. This constant being born and dying is 
called samsara. The essential point, then, is not release from death, but 
release from birth-and-death. When Plato speaks of immortality, he 
takes as his premise the fact that a person is mortal, that is, a 
perishable existence; and when Christianity speaks of eternal life, it 
takes life as the foundation. Certainly immortality could be attained if 
death could be extinguished. Eternal life could be realized if death 
could be conquered. But must we not say that these views are still one­
sided, and that what is sought therein is still the extension of life in 
some form—that is, in a different transcendent dimension?
In Plato’s case, however, immortality of the soul is not merely 
related to life after death, as we have seen above, but to pre-existence 
before birth as well. The soul is thought to transcend birth, death, and 
the changes of the body, and to be immortal and eternal through its ex­
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istence before birth and after death. The soul, being permanent and un­
changing, has an Idea-like character. Indeed, when Plato says that the 
true philosopher practices dying while living, we find a common aspect 
between Plato’s standpoint and Buddhism. But in Plato’s case, to the 
extent the meaning of death is questioned, the meaning of birth and the 
meaning of coming to be born as a person, is not deeply questioned. 
The dualistic theory which conceives of the realm of the Ideas behind 
phenomena and the infinite behind the finite does not avoid causing 
Plato’s grasp of the problem of death to be objective and con­
templative. Therefore, is not non-being ultimately a kind of being, and 
the immortal nothing other than a transformed form of life?
On that point Christianity, which does not conceive of body and 
soul as merely dualistically opposed, but rather attempts to grasp 
human existence as a unity and understand it as a creature created from 
nothing, must be said to have been more thoroughgoing in its 
understanding of death. In Plato, who taught that when death presses 
upon a person, that which perishes is the body, while the soul concedes 
the place to that which must die and goes away and preserves its own 
Idea-like permanent nature, the human finitude and temporality can­
not be said to have been fully realized. Christianity, on the contrary, 
holds that human beings and history begin together with the original 
sin as rebellion against the word of God, the absolute. The Christian is 
self-conscious, in an extremely acute way, of the finitude and temporal­
ity of man who is destined to die. All the more, the faith that one’s sin 
and death are vanquished by the death of Jesus on the cross and his 
resurrection, and the hope in eternal life based thereon, must be said to 
be extremely profound.
Nevertheless, in that Christianity sets up God as creator, it has no 
place for “no-birth,” or the “unborn.” Fundamentally the creator ex­
presses absolute life. God, the creator, is eternal life itself. It may be 
thought that for the Christian, while there is death and the hope of eter­
nal life as victory over it, there is no self-consciousness of unbornness. 
But in the case of Christianity, can it not be understood that the 
character of being unborn applies to God, though not to man who is a 
creature? For God, the creator, creates all things while himself being 
uncreated. In other words, if we follow the phraseology of John Scotus 
Erigena, there is God who creates and is not created: natura creans et 
non creata. (In orthodox Christianity, however, God is not “neither 
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creating nor created”—natura nec creata nec creans.) But this un­
createdness is said only of God and not of man, the creature. Concern­
ing us human beings, even though the phrases life and death, eternal 
life and new life, are used, in the case of Christianity they take the ab­
solute life of God the creator as foundation, and possess the character 
of realization of divine life within history. The axis of realization of the 
will of this living God within history is precisely the cross of Jesus 
Christ. God who is the lord of life and death (2 Cor. 1:9) has had his on­
ly son Jesus Christ die on the cross and rise again from the dead. It can 
even be understood that in this death and resurrection of Christ, God 
himself experiences the test of death and thus crushes death.10 Therein 
death is truly vanquished and the new age (aiOri) of the resurrection 
begins. This is, however, realized in Jesus Christ, the son of God, and 
does not apply directly to all people. Although it does not take a 
dualistic relation of body and soul, Christianity nevertheless grasps 
God and man in a special kind of dualistic relation, that is, as creator 
and creature or as redeemer and the redeemed. In other words, the 
horizontal dualism between body and soul is overcome, but the vertical 
dualism between God and man is retained. In the cross of Jesus Christ, 
the transcendence of God and the immanence of man interpenetrates in 
perfect concreteness. In his death and resurrection, a subjective stand­
point of transcendence-qua-immanence is revealed, and taking this 
point as pivot, history is transformed into eternal life by overcoming 
sin and death. These things themselves, however, are all possible within 
the transcendent nature of God. This transcendent nature of God, in 
the present case, is the eternal life of God. Herein would seem to lie the 
reason why “no-birth” or “unborn” never becomes seriously prob­
lematic in Christianity.
10 Alan Richardson, ed., A Theological Word Book of the Bible (London: SCM 
Press, 1950), p. 60; cf. Heb. 2:14 ff.
VII
In Buddhism, on the contrary, both “undying” and “unborn” have 
become important issues. The Buddhist seeks not merely no-death (the 
immortal), but “no-birth-and-no-death.” As I have stated above, this 
is precisely because the Buddhist does not understand human existence 
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merely as subject to death, but grasps it as that which is birth-and- 
death or living-dying. Throughout the Buddhist scriptures we meet 
with expressions which regard the reality of human being as that which 
is bom and dies. In early Buddhism, it is well known that included in 
the “noble truth of suffering” there is the teaching of the four suffer­
ings of birth, old age, sickness, and death; and in the “twelve causes,” 
there is the teaching of old age, dying, and birth as the point of depar­
ture for investigating human illusions. In the ffarangama stltra, it is 
written: “After birth there is death, after death there is birth, birth and 
birth, death and death, like a wheel of fire, it never stops” (vol. III). In 
the Vijnaptimdtratasiddhi-tiistra it is written: “While one has not yet 
attained true enlightenment, he is always in a dream; therefore the Bud­
dha teaches the long night of birth and death” (vol. VII). Again in the 
SukhavatT-vyQha: “Birth and death turn in endless cycles” (vol. I). 
Other such expressions which grasp the form of human beings who are 
birth-and-death are too numerous to cite: “The realm of birth and 
death,” “The cloud of birth and death,” “The shore of birth and 
death,” “The ocean of birth and death,” “The sorrowful ocean of 
birth and death,” “The prison of birth and death,” “The mud of birth 
and death,” “The bonds of birth and death,” “The stream of birth 
and death,” “The wheel of birth and death,” etc. It seems to go 
without saying that the aim of Buddhism lies in “plucking out the root 
of all the hardship and suffering of birth-and-death” (Sukhavatl-vyaha 
stitra).
How, then, can one pluck out “the root of the hardship and suffer­
ing of birth-and-death”? Birth-and-death as suffering signifies attach­
ment to the existence of the self that is ceaseless birth-and-death, and 
thereby signifies a bondage by birth-and-death. That all things are im­
permanent is one of the fundamental teachings of the Buddha. There is 
nothing permanent and unchanging, nothing that endures as it is. 
Within such impermanence, however, we ceaselessly seek what is 
permanent and infinite. This fundamental desire is called “longing” 
(tanhd). All sufferings arise as a result of this longing, for the dissatis­
faction of longing is suffering. What, then, is this longing based on? It 
is based precisely on ignorance (avidyd) of the true nature of human 
life that is impermanent. It is precisely this fundamental ignorance that 
lies at the root of human existence; it is the ultimate condition that is 
not grounded on anything more ultimate. Accordingly, when this fun­
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damental ignorance is extinguished, longing is extinguished as well, 
and all suffering in turn disappears.
In reference to the question of birth-and-death, if one is not attached 
to the existence of the self which is birth-and-death, and if one clearly 
awakens to the fact of birth-and-death and impermanence, one should 
be able to transcend the sufferings of birth-and-death. It is written in 
the earliest Buddhist scriptures:
Seeing the terrible results of attachment produced and caused 
by birth and death, they achieve unattachment to the causa­
tions of birth and death, and experience release.
Achieving peace and composure they rejoice and ex­
perience nirvana in this life; they transcend all anger and fear, 
and transcend all sufferings. (Majjhima-Nikaya, III, p. 187-g)
In Buddhism, there is no thought of struggling with death, overcom­
ing it, and thereby becoming victorious over it. For the Buddhist, 
death is, of course, painful and sorrowful, but as long as he or she is a 
person, who is birth-and-death, death is totally unavoidable. Neither 
disgracefully attached to life por audaciously attempting to conquer 
death, the Buddhist attempts quietly to thoroughly realize the stark 
“principle of birth-and-death.” The Buddhist is fully aware of the fact 
of birth-and-death and impermanence. Therein lies the way along 
which one transcends birth-and-death while living in birth-and-death. 
The Buddhist does not conquer death; he frees himself from—is eman­
cipated from—birth-and-death. In that sense, the death of the Buddha 
under the twin sQla trees is diametrically opposed to the death of Jesus 
on the cross. In the death of the expiring Jesus who, while nailed to the 
cross, emitted the endlessly agonizing cry, “My God, my God, why 
hast thou forsaken me?” people cannot fail to be deeply moved by per­
sonally feeling the severity of the suffering of death symbolized by the 
man Jesus. I have already elaborated the point above that the Christian 
faith consists in believing that in this death and resurrection of Christ, 
“Jesus our Lord . . . was put to death for our trespasses, and raised for 
our justification” (Rom. 4:24-25). But in the case of the Buddha, there 
is no such anguish of death and no victory over death by resurrec­
tion.11
11 There is a kind of resurrection story in Buddhism, too, about the appearance of
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In his entering into nirvana, his death seems to have been far closer 
to the death of Socrates who calmly took the hemlock and quietly met 
death. Socrates willingly died believing that by death the soul is 
released from the body, returns to the world of the pure Ideas, and par­
ticipates in eternal wisdom. But from the original standpoint of Bud­
dhism I have cited above, Socrates’ death is still not a true awareness 
or right seeing of the principle of birth-and-death and impermanence; 
even if it is Idea-like, the desire for the immortal soul in the next life 
cannot avoid being a “longing.” This seems to be unavoidable as long 
as Plato sees the Ideas as existing behind present reality, while taking 
the perspective of a contemplative dualism.
VIII
It seems entirely natural for Buddhism, which seeks not mere over­
coming of death but release from birth-and-death, to thematize not the 
immortal, but the unborn and undying, that is, nirvana which is 
beyond birth and death. Although the Buddhist clearly perceives birth- 
and-death, he or she does not understand the unavoidability of birth- 
and-death contemplatively or follow the determination of birth-and- 
death negatively. Rather the Buddhist is taught to awaken to the 
original nature that is free from birth and death. DOgen’s statement, 
“To clarify birth and to clarify death is for the Buddhist the single 
most important issue,” also exhibits this kind of positive sense. Conse­
quently the Buddhist notion of “no-birth” or “unborn” does not 
indicate the notion of not being born. It means to transcend and be 
released from birth-and-death. Not merely no-birth relative to no­
death, but no-birth-and-no-death (JushO fushi constitutes the
true meaning of “no-birth” or “unborn” (fusho ^±). Only when pre­
cisely this kind of “unborn” becomes the existential subject does there 
arise the experience of true release which is emancipated from birth- 
and-death while being birth-and-death. The resolution of the problem 
of death which Buddhism seeks lies herein.
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Shakyamuni from the golden casket.- But this story is hardly essential to Buddhist 
teaching, unlike the resurrection of Jesus Christ which is essential to the Christian 
teaching, and actually constitutes the core of its faith. This story may be interpreted 
merely as a kind of legend customarily attached to the biography of a great religious 
personality.
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In Buddhism, the expression “unborn” is widely employed. For 
example, at the outset of the MAdhyamika philosophy, which is con­
sidered to have clarified the fundamental standpoint of Mahayana Bud­
dhism, NAgArjuna expounded the Middle Way of the eightfold nega­
tion and clarified the reason why all dharmas “have no self nature and 
are empty” thereby.12 The Middle Way of the eightfold negation can 
be condensed into one phrase: “unbornness” (fushd). In the Hua-yen 
(Kegon) school it is said: “No-birth of a single thought (ichinen fusho 
—£1^), precisely this is the Buddha” (Kegon gokyOsho, I). Again, in 
the Shingon school, it is said: “A-kOra (ultimate Reality) is originally 
unborn” (a-ji honfusho In the Shingon teaching of the Ten
12 The eightfold negation is “neither birth nor extinction, neither interruption nor 
permanence, neither sameness nor difference, neither coming in nor going out.”
13 Norman Waddell (tr.), Unborn: The Life and Teachings of Zen Master Bankei 
(San Francisco: North Point Press, 1984).
Stages of Mind, the seventh stage, “The awakened mind is unborn 
mind” (kakushin fushOshin >«bT£'6)» teaches that “one who 
awakens to the fact that this mind is essentially unborn gradually enters 
into the gate of a-kGra (a-ji mon H3T1)” (Kukai, JajU shinron). In the 
Pure Land teaching, T’an-luan writes that “being born in the Pure 
Land” (QjO has the meaning of the birth of “no-birth” (Ching-t'u 
lun chu). In Shinran’s KOsO wasan there are the words: “Since depend­
ing on the TathAgata’s pure original vow, there is the birth of no­
birth” (Nyorai shOjO hongan no mushO no shO narikereba
Indeed in Ch’an, or Zen, “unborn” is strongly emphasized in an ex­
tremely subjective and realistic form. Bankei expounds FushOzen (the 
unborn Zen) in the words: “In everyone there is the clear and unborn 
Buddha mind. Do not darken it; be unborn.”13 Passing over this quote 
for the moment, even the words used as a kOan since ancient times, 
“See your Original Face before the birth of your father and mother,” 
do not merely mean to awaken to the self of no-birth relative to no­
death, but to awaken to the self of no-birth-and-no-death, the original 
Self which transcends birth-and-death. Huang-po said that “if there is 
no seeking, that is the unborn mind; if there is no attachment that is 
the undying; unborn and undying are precisely the Buddha.” He then 
warned a monk: “If you desire to attain the becoming of Buddhahood .. . 
only study non-seeking and non-attachment” (Ch’uan-hsin fa-yao
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&». Indeed, “when emotion and cognition are extinguished, birth- 
and-death are empty, when birth-and-death are empty, the way of Bud­
dha is attained” (T'ien-mu Chung-feng ho-shang kuang-lu
jKft). The words of Kanzan Egen, “Within myself there is no birth- 
and-death” would also be an expression of the self-awakening to un­
bornness in the true sense. This kind of realization of no-birth-and-no- 
death is nirvana in the Buddhist sense.
However, if one empties this birth-and-death and goes no further 
than a nirvana which has escaped from birth-and-death, one is descend­
ing to a realization of no-birth-and-no-death relative to birth-and- 
death. In that case, no-birth-and-death, unbornness itself, would be 
grasped objectively and would be attached as “unbornness.” In this 
limitation, that would precisely be to go no further than a negative 
kind of quietism. However, Buddhism does not teach one to escape 
from birth-and-death and to enter into nirvana by not dwelling in 
birth-and-death, but to return to the world of birth-and-death by not 
dwelling even in nirvana. To enter into nirvana and yet not remain 
there, but to sojourn in the garden of birth-and-death, is true nirvana. 
Consequently, even though we speak of transcending birth-and-death, 
or emptying birth-and-death, this hardly means to get out of or flee 
from birth-and-death. It means to penetrate birth-and-death itself 
through and through. By doing so, one transcends birth-and-death 
from within. Accordingly, nirvana cannot be something apart from 
birth-and-death. Instead, birth-and-death as it is, is nirvana. Therein 
lies the self-awakening to unbornness. Ddgen writes:
This present birth and death itself is the Life of Buddha. If 
you attempt to reject it with distaste, you are losing thereby 
the Life of Buddha. If you abide in it, attaching to birth and 
death, you also lose the Life of Buddha, and leave yourself 
with [only] the appearance of Buddha. You only attain the 
mind of Buddha when there is no hating [of birth and death] 
and no desiring [for nirvana].14
14 DOgcn’s ShObOgenzO ShOji (Birth and Death), tr. Norman Waddell and Abe 
Masao, Eastern Buddhist Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1972), p. 79.
Consequently in true nirvana, the subject of unbornness is birth-and- 
death precisely as no-birth-and-no-death, and functions in the realm of 
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samsara. A poem of ShidO Munan, Zen master of seventeenth-century 
Japan, says,
While living, become a dead man 
Thoroughly dead 
Then do as you wilt;
All will be all right.
This is a direct expression of the point I am trying to make. It differs 
both from Plato’s “practicing of dying’’ and from the death and resur­
rection of Jesus Christ. Do we not find therein the most thoroughgoing 
self-consciousness of death and a way of resolution which transcends 
every kind of dualism and which is directly verified in the immediacy of 
the present?
IX
Nevertheless, is not this kind of Buddhist standpoint reducible, like 
the standpoint of Plato, to an a-temporal, a-historical world? And in 
that case, is not the meaning of history ultimately robbed, and ethics 
also excluded? These reservations have often been brought against Bud­
dhism in comparison with Christianity; they are problems to which 
Buddhists must earnestly address themselves.
Christianity is a religion based upon the revelation of God; it rests 
upon faith that the word of God has been revealed within history. On 
that faith is grounded a view of history and an eschatological view of 
ethics in which the meaning, direction, and purpose of history is given 
by revelation. It is only natural that Buddhism, which stands not on 
the revelation of God but on human self-awakening, does not have a 
view of history and a view of ethics in the same sense as Christianity. Is 
there, then, an historical view and an ethical view special to Buddhism? 
It may be thought that, at least up to the present time, Buddhism has 
lacked a theologically systematized view of history. Profound philos­
ophies of time have existed in Buddhism for a long time, but it would 
seem that human existence has not been understood as essentially 
historical existence, and the truth of Buddhism has not been accepted 
as linked to historical self-consciousness—with a notable exception of 
the doctrine of the three stages of the Dharma.15 This would certainly 
seem to indicate a lack of historical consciousness. But it may be 
56
THE PROBLEM OF DEATH
thought that a very thoroughgoing self-consciousness of primal-history 
(Urgeschichte) is implicit within Buddhism. I should like to touch upon 
this point very briefly in relation to the problem of birth-and-death.
I stated above that, in Buddhism, man is grasped not merely as a 
perishable being, but as an existence which is birth-and-death. To be 
birth-and-death fundamentally is understood as the “birth-and-death 
of the moment” (setsuna-shoji The “birth-and-death of one
life time” (ichigo no shOji —can be understood only on the 
basis of this “birth-and-death of the moment.” Accordingly, that we 
human beings are existences that are birth-and-death, means that we 
are existences which are born and die at every moment. This is the 
“principle of birth-and-death.” Being attached to life and loathing 
death, to be deluded in birth-and-death, arises from a lack of self­
awakening to this principle of birth-and-death. On the other hand, to 
enter into nirvana by transcending birth-and-death is nothing other 
than self-awakening to this principle of momentary life-and-death. 
Therein the Buddhist is born and dies moment after moment and enters 
into nirvana moment after moment. Accordingly, the Mahayana em­
phasis that birth-and-death (samsara) is nirvana does not mean that 
samsara is simply identical with nirvana. Rather birth-and-death is 
thoroughly birth-and-death; nirvana is thoroughly nirvana. When it is, 
however, truly subjectively or existentially realized that samsara is the 
birth-and-death at each and every moment that cannot be objectified 
and substantialized, samsara is transcended from within and turns into 
nirvana at each and every moment. Nirvana is fundamentally nirvana 
of the moment (setsuna-nehan If that were not the case, then
nirvana itself would thereby be substantialized. True nirvana is “nir­
vana of the moment,” which is realized moment after moment. Sam­
sara ceaselessly turns into nirvana because it is samsara of the moment.
15 The doctrine of right, semblance, and final (shOzOmatsu Dharma refers to
the three periods of the Buddhist teaching after the Buddha's decease. It was especially 
influential during the Sui and T’ang dynasties in China and during the Heian and 
Kamakura periods in Japan. There are different views as to the duration of these 
periods. According to the one prevalent in the Kamakura period, the first period, 
believed to last 1,000 years, is called the right Dharma (shobo iEft), in which Buddhist 
doctrine, practice, and enlightenment all exist; the second period of 1,000 years is the 
period of the semblance, “imitative" Dharma (zOhb in which doctrine and prac­
tices exist without enlightenment; the third and last period of 10,000 years is that of the 
latter or final Dharma (mappt) in which only the doctrine remains.
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Nirvana ceaselessly returns to samsara precisely because it is nirvana of 
the moment. Samsara and nirvana are thus united through mutual 
negation at each moment. The unextended, subjective point where sam­
sara and nirvana are mutually united through negation is nothing other 
than the moment (ksana). This moment is the place where we are born 
and die in actual reality, and is the openness in which nirvana subjec­
tively takes place.
Indeed, moment in this sense is not an extremely small amount of 
time. It is the moment of the “now” wherein the infinite past and in­
finite future are self-consciously included and self-consciously 
transcended. All time of past, present, and future are transcended 
precisely in the moment of the “now.” The eternal is realized at pres­
ent, and the wheel of birth-and-death which has no beginning or end is 
broken and converted into the silence and purity of nirvana which is 
boundless and inexhaustible. Moreover, as long as the moment is the 
moment, there is transition from moment to moment while each mo­
ment is thoroughly independent in itself. There is endless passage. 
That, however, is not a simple immediate continuity (renzoku but 
discontinuous succession (sOzoku tSiS).
Precisely because moments are essentially discontinously successive, 
the birth-and-death of the moment incessantly turns into nirvana, and 
nirvana incessantly returns to birth-and-death. Birth-and-death is emp­
tied moment after moment; nirvana is realized moment after moment. 
The expression, “Only after experiencing the Great Death is one 
reborn” also indicates the decisive moment in which birth-and-death is 
transcended and the dialectical identity of samsara-is-nirvana is subjec­
tively realized. The moments before the Great Death are the moments 
of flux; the moments after the Great Death are the moments of release. 
The former are moments grasped by substantializing them such that 
they are immediately continuous. Consequently, the momentariness of 
birth-and-death cannot be realized therein; birth-and-death becomes 
an object of attachment. The principle of momentary birth-and-death 
is realized in the moment of release. The mutual conversion of sam~ 
sara-is-nirvana is subjectively and existentially realized to be successive, 
moment after moment, in spite of the discontinuity of each moment.
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X
This kind of Buddhist standpoint, even if it thematizes the relation 
of time and eternity, may perhaps be still unable to grasp the problem 
of history, the essence and meaning of history. Time is not directly 
history. The nature of time and the nature of history must be 
distinguished. Time only becomes “history” when the factor of 
spatiality (concretely, “worldhood,” Weltlichkeit) is added to it, and 
is permeated by the self-consciousness of the uniqueness (Ein- 
malichkeit) of time.
Since ancient times, Buddhism has used the terms loka and 
lokadhatu, which mean “society” (seken tfirlMJ) or “world” (sekai tft#). 
The word seken simultaneously connotes spatiality as a place and tem­
porality as/fax, and is, needless to say, the world in which sentient be­
ings dwell. “The impermanence of the world” is a fundamental thesis 
of Buddhism, and it cannot be separated from the birth-and-death and 
impermanence of sentient beings. That all sentient beings undergo the 
flux of birth-and-death means that they exist in society (seken) or the 
world (sekai) as sunk down into the flux. Thus, the expression, “to 
leave or transcend the world” (shusseken MtfrM) truly means to trans­
cend this kind of flux, to be released from the flux of birth-and-death.
For Buddhism, history is “the history of 'lokadhOtu' (the world),” 
“the history of being sunk down in the flux.” It is the “history of the 
impermanence of the world,” the “history of the flux of birth-and- 
death of sentient beings.” This flux is beginningless and endless. 
Because there is neither creation nor an end of time, history for Bud­
dhism does not have a particular direction. It has no direction, yet 
history is not directionless. Therein lies the profundity of the imper­
manence of history. However, when we once truly penetrate the birth- 
and-death of the moment and transcend it, the history of the flux of 
birth-and-death is also transcended. What is revealed therein is no 
longer “the history of the world” but the “history of transcending the 
world” (shusseken no rekishi no longer “the history of
samsara” but “the history of nirvana” which is emancipation.
As stated above, however, just as samsara and nirvana are mutually 
united through negation and succeed each other moment by moment in 
the self-consciousness of the Buddhist, so too the history of birth-and- 
death and the history of emancipation are mutually united through 
59
ABE
negation in the moment and are subjectively (discontinuously) suc­
cessive. Accordingly, “the history of transcending the world” does not 
take place on the other-shore at the end of the “history of the world.” 
We self-awaken to the impermanence of the world and the flux of 
birth-and-death of all sentient beings by penetrating the birth-and- 
death of the present moment of the self In that present moment, 
although the history of the world is thoroughly the history of the 
world, its impermanence is transcended from within and it turns into 
the history of transcending the world. Moreover, at the same time, the 
history of transcending the world, while completely being the history 
of transcending the world, turns into the history of the world in which 
one experiences the process of birth-and-death. It is precisely the sub­
ject of this dialectical interchange of the history of the world and the 
history of transcending the world who experiences the momentary nir­
vana while experiencing the momentary birth-and-death. It is this sub­
ject who acts while bound by neither samsara nor n/nw, yet freely 
goes out and enters into both samsara and nirvana. Therein lies the 
foundation that grounds creative activity which creates history by tran­
scending history; therein lies the basis of the Buddhist ethic: “However 
innumerable sentient beings are, I vow to save them.”
Indeed, there is neither a beginning nor an end to history in Bud­
dhism, which takes the impermanence of the world and self-awakening 
to the momentary birth-and-death as its foundation. The moment and 
history dialectically co-arise and co-perish. In any moment of the 
endless development of history there is the endless return of history. In 
every moment, development toward the historical future is at the same 
time a return to the origin of history. History in Buddhism is “the 
history of the moment.” It is also “the history of discontinuous succes­
sion,” which is a succession being neither of the past as in Platonic 
reminiscence nor of the future as in Christian resurrection. It is of the 
absolute present as a discontinuous succession of the moment. Thus 
may we not conclude the following? Greek history is a history of return 
and reminiscence; Christian history is a history of instants16 and of 
16 I consider it crucial to clarify the difference between the “instant” (Augenblick) 
in Christianity such as used by Kierkegaard, and the Buddhist notion of “moment” 
(ksana) in order to clarify the differences between the theory of time and history of 
each religion.
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repetition. Buddhist history, in contrast, is the history of the moment 
and discontinuous succession.
We have gradually come this far in our inquiry into the self-con­
sciousness of death in the East and the West. Yet the problem of death, 
no matter how much words are piled up, cannot in the end be touched 
in its reality. In reference to the question of birth-and-death, as Tao- 
wu answered to the question of Chien-yuan, “I won’t tell! I won’t 
tell!” must be the only correct answer.17
17 Tao-wu iM#, a Zen master of the late T’ang dynasty, went one day with his disci­
ple Chien-yuan *£ to visit a family in mourning. Chien-yuan was a young monk seek­
ing for truth, and was especially concerned with the problem of life and death. To 
learn what was in his master’s mind, Chien-yuan knocked on the coffin and said, “Liv­
ing or dead?” Tao-wu instantly responded, “Living? I tell you not! Dead? I tell you 
not!” “Why not?” asked the disciple. To this the master replied, “I won’t tell! I won’t 
tell!” (Iwaji, iwaji M CM C). Chien-yuan, however, had not yet come to the point of 
realization for himself. When they were halfway on their homeward walk, he again ac­
costed his master, saying, “Master, please tell me about it. If you don’t I will strike 
you down.” The master responded, “As for striking, it is up to you. As for talking, 1 
have nothing to tell you.” Thereupon the disciple struck him. Had Tao-wu at that time 
proclaimed the immortality of soul or eternal life to Chien-yuan, the disciple might 
have been satisfied. But the master had repeated the same negative answer, and Chien- 
yuan was quietly sent away. Later, he went to Shih-shuang SS, one of Tao-wu’s 
disciples, and telling him his story, he asked the monk to enlighten him on the matter. 
Shih-shuang also said, “Living? I tell you not! Dead? I tell you not!” “Why won’t you 
tell me?” demanded Chien-yuan. “I won’t tell! I won’t tell!” repeated Shih-shuang. 
This instantly opened up Chien-yuan’s mind. See Pi-yen-lu (Blue Cliff Record), Case 
55. See also D. T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism, Second Series (1933), p. 219 ff. and 
Masao Abe, “ ’Life and Death’ and ‘Good and Evil’ in Zen,” Criterion, Vol. 9, No. 1 
(1969), p. 10.
Translated by David Dilworth
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